When Parliament passed the triple-talaq law in July 2019, instant divorce by that method had already been set aside by the Supreme Court. The new decision was to make its pronouncement a criminal offence, punishable by up to three years in prison and a fine. [1] [2]
That distinction matters to the chronology. In August 2017, a three-to-two majority in Shayara Bano had invalidated talaq-e-biddat. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, which received assent on 31 July 2019, added a statutory prohibition, penalties and provisions for a woman and her children. [1] [2]
What Parliament added
The Act covers talaq-e-biddat and similar forms purporting to produce an instantaneous, irrevocable divorce. It makes such pronouncements void and illegal whether spoken, written or communicated electronically. Its definition is specific: it does not outlaw every form of Muslim divorce. [2]
The legislation provides for a subsistence allowance for the woman and dependent children, and for custody of minor children, as determined by a magistrate. It also gives the woman a role in criminal proceedings. The offence becomes cognizable on information from her or a relative by blood or marriage; a magistrate may allow settlement at her instance. Bail requires hearing her and finding reasonable grounds. [2]
Modi described the passage as advancing gender justice and equality. The government’s rationale was that declaring the practice invalid needed an enforceable sanction. Yet the existence of a penalty and the availability of an allowance are different from evidence that women receive support or that pronouncements have stopped. [3] [5]
The argument over punishment
Challenges to the law brought that distinction before the Supreme Court. At a January 2025 hearing, petitioners opposed criminalising a pronouncement that could no longer dissolve the marriage; the government defended punishment as protection against the continuing practice. The dispute concerned the criminal remedy, rather than a demand to restore instant divorce. [5]
The Court’s written order asked the Union to file an affidavit setting out the number of FIRs and chargesheets under the Act. It was a request for evidence in the constitutional challenge, not a judgment endorsing or striking down the legislation. [4]
A parliamentary reply two months later exposed a limit in the public national record. Asked for registered cases by year and state, the minority affairs ministry said it maintained no such data centrally and pointed to states’ responsibility for policing. That did not mean there were no cases. It meant that the reply supplied no national series with which to measure enforcement. For women seeking protection, the practical record still depends on complaints being heard, support being ordered and those orders being carried out. [6]